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Abstract—Adversarial attacks are inputs that are similar to
original inputs but altered on purpose. Speech-to-text neural
networks that are widely used today are prone to misclassify ad-
versarial attacks [1], [2], [3]. In this study, first, we investigate the
presence of targeted adversarial attacks [4], [11] by altering wave
forms from Common Voice data set. We craft adversarial wave
forms via Connectionist Temporal Classification Loss Function
[13], [14], [15] and attack DeepSpeech [12]– speech-to-text neural
network implemented by Mozilla. We achieve 100% adversarial
success rate (zero successful classification by DeepSpeech) on all
25 adversarial wave forms that we crafted. Second, we investigate
the use of PCA as a defense mechanism against adversarial
attacks.We reduce dimensionality by applying PCA to these
25 attacks that we created and test them against DeepSpeech.
We observe zero successful classification by DeepSpeech, which
suggests PCA is not a good defense mechanism in audio domain.
Finally, instead of using PCA as a defense mechanism, we use
PCA this time to craft adversarial inputs under a black-box
setting with minimal adversarial knowledge. With no knowledge
regarding the model, parameters, or weights, we craft adversarial
attacks by applying PCA to samples from Common Voice data
set, and achieve 100% adversarial success under black-box setting
again when tested against DeepSpeech. We also experiment with
different percentage of components necessary to result in a
classification during attacking process. In all cases, adversary
becomes successful.
Index Terms—Audio attacks, DeepSpeech, Adversarial At-
tacks, Speech-to-Text Neural Network, Connectionist Temporal
Classification, Recurrent Neural Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous recent studies have demonstrated how Deep
Neural Network (DNN) classifiers can be fooled by adversarial
examples [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] in which an attacker adds
perturbations to an original sample, causing the classifier to
misclassify the sample [6]. Adversarial attacks that render
DNNs vulnerable in real life represent a serious threat, given
the consequences of improperly functioning autonomous ve-
hicles, malware filters, or bio-metric authentication systems
[7], [8], [9]. Social network companies, law enforcement,
and various commercial interests may wish to be able to use
image classification and speech-to- text transcription tools with
defensive mechanisms that are robust to adversarial attacks [2],
[11], in order to reduce these attacks effectiveness. Wide usage
of DNNs makes the problem of creating robust and secure
DNNs even more important in safety-critical applications. We
are interested in exploring whether there are any particular
characteristics of audio recognition which seem to make
adversarial attacks successful in this area. Current attacks that
have been studied were primarily in the image domain [4], [5],
[6], [7], such as those of Carlini [2] and Papernot et al [17].
Such attacks have been studied as proof-of-concepts, where
adversarial attackers are assumed to have full knowledge of the
classifier (e.g. model, architecture, model weights, parameters,
training and testing data sets). The strongest attack in the
literature at the time of writing this article is Carlini’s attack
[11] based on the L2 norm, and it is a white-box attack
requiring full knowledge of the model. Much of this research
has been interested in developing the most effective attacks
possible, to be used as standards against which to test the
robustness of classifier RNNs [2]. With less knowledge of
the classifier model, the effectiveness of the attack decreases.
There is also interest in crafting attacks that assume minimal
knowledge of the adversary –that is, attacks under black-box
setting – regarding the classifier model, since in most real
world applications the adversary does not have access to the
classifier’s parameters unless the adversary is an insider.
We are inspired by work on image domain [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6] and investigate the audio domain in this paper. We use
Common Voice Data set, which is widely used as a standard
audio data set in the literature [11]. Being a widely used
data set, it provides a common ground for different research
labs all around the world. We use 25 samples from Common
Voice to create our adversarial attacks. We also use Deep-
Speech, a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription neural
network implemented by Mozilla [12] to test our attacks. In
the literature, one can see that Recurrent Neural Networks
are often used for audio transcription/decoding systems [13],
[14], [15]. RNNs are effective to map an audio signal to a
sequence of probability distributions over individual charac-
ters. DeepSpeech, for example, is a recurrent neural network
that uses Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) Neural Network
Architectures. Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC)
[13] is a method of training a sequence-to-sequence neural
network when the alignment between the input and output
sequences is not known. DeepSpeech uses CTC because the
inputs are an audio sample of a person speaking, and the
unaligned transcribed sentences, where the exact position of
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each word in the audio sample is not known. In order to study
neural networks in the audio recognition field, we focus on
creating adversarial attacks that are crafted under white-box
setting, as well as black box setting. For white-box approached
attacks [11], we represent audio as a N-dimensional vector x.
Each element xi is a signed 16-bit value sampled at 16KHz.
Targeted attacks are crafted as follows: One second of given
waveform is split into 50 frames. Input domain consists of
single frames and the output domain consists of characters
in the a-z space. RNN (in our case, we have a hook to the
DeepSpeech’s language decoder, and RNN) takes a sequence
of N frames and returns a probability distribution over the
output domain for each frame. While CTC maps every frame
to a probability distribution over the characters, this does
not directly give a probability distribution over all phrases.
The probability of a phrase is defined as a function of the
probability of each character. For in-depth analysis, we refer
the reader to [25]. Here, we begin with two short definitions.
We say that a sequence Π reduces to a shortened sequence
defined p if starting with Π and making the following two
operations (in order) yields p:
1) Remove all sequentially duplicated tokens.
2) Remove all e tokens
For example, the sequence a a b e e b reduces to a b b. We
say that Π is an alignment of p with respect to target labels y
if
1) Π reduces to p,
2) the length of p is equal to the length of y.
The probability of alignment p under y is the product of the
likelihoods of each of its elements:
Pr(Π |y) =
∏
i
yi
pii
With these definitions, we can now define the probability of a
given phrase p under the distribution y = f(x) as
Pr(p|y) =
∑
pi∈∏(p,y)Pr(pi |y) =
∑
pi∈∏(p,y)
∏
i
yi
pii
As is usually done, the loss function used to train the
network is the negative log likelihood of the desired phrase:
CTC− Loss( f (x), p) = −logPr(p| f (x)).
To decode a vector y to a phrase p, we search for the phrase
p that best aligns to y.
C(x) = argmaxpPr(p| f (x))
The search space is non-trivial. Current literature suggests
some optimization algorithm and use of dynamic programming
to help find the phrase p [11]. In our study, it is approximated
via Beam Search Decoding. Beam Search Decoding simulta-
neously evaluates the likelihood of multiple alignments pi and
then chooses the most likely phrase p under these alignments.
We refer the reader to [13] for a complete algorithm descrip-
tion.
We were able to craft adversarial attacks against Common
Voice data set which achieved 100% misclassification rate
against the classifier when tested against DeepSpeech. The
perturbed audio files produced by this attack, while altered,
were still clearly identifiable to a human. Even visually, the
wave forms are nearly indistinguishable as it can be seen in
Figure 2 and 3
II. RELATED WORK
Previously, adversarial examples have focused largely on
domain of images, and face detection. In the discrete domain,
text classification is also studied [19]. However, adversarial
attacks in audio recognition domain remains relatively new.
1) Goodfellow et al, (2013) highlighted adversarial examples
as a ubiquitous threat to different neural network models
[10]
2) Papernot et al, (2016) showed the limitations of deep
neural networks in image recognition [20]
3) Adrian et al, (2018) showed that adversarial training can
be used as a defense against attacks in image domain [21]
4) Carlini et al, (2018) crafted targeted audio adversarial
attacks [11]
5) Yakura et al, (2019) demonstrated the possibility of an
over-the-air audio attacks [22].
We are inspired by the previous work, where adversarial were
attacking image classifiers in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. By
investigating adversarial attacks in audio domain, and looking
at different ways of crafting attacks, we hope our research may
help to advance the study of adversarial attacks on RNNs and
defensive mechanisms to counteract them, particularly in the
audio recognition domain.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this study, we are tacking the following problems:
(i) How can we produce strong adversarial examples in audio
domain, i.e., transferable adversarial examples that fool a
model with high confidence while requiring only a small
perturbation?
(ii) How can we train a model to be robust so that there
are no audio adversarial examples, or at least so that an
adversary cannot find them easily?
To answer these questions, we investigate creating audio
adversarial attacks, and explore evaluating robustness of a
neural network on following aspects:
1) Presence/Robustness of white-box and black-box adver-
sarial attacks (Can we embed a sentence into a song? Can
we force DeepSpeech to transcribe a sentence to some
other sentence that we want? Can we reduce number
of frequency components so that difference is subtle
enough for a human to not recognize, but big enough
for DeepSpeech to transcribe it poorly without any ad-
versarial knowledge regarding model weight, parameters,
and architecture?)
2) Use of PCA to craft adversarial attacks under black-box
setting with minimal adversary knowledge regarding the
model (Can we use PCA to alter the audio and result in
misclassification by the RNN?)
3) Use of PCA as a defense mechanism (Can we use PCA to
smooth out the adversarial noise, and recover the original
content?)
We have the following basic approach in this study.
1) Use PCA to craft adversarial attacks in audio under black-
box setting with minimal adversarial knowledge
2) Use CTC loss function, gradient descent, on a Long short-
term memory architecture (LSTM) to craft adversarial
attacks in audio under white-box setting with full adver-
sarial knowledge.
3) Apply attacks to DeepSpeech and compare results.
4) Use PCA as a defense mechanism to smooth out the
adversarial noise in order to see if robustness is improved
against adversarial attacks
When we are creating targeted attacks, we assume that the
adversary has complete access to a neural network, including
the architecture and all parameters, and can use this in a white-
box manner. This is a conservative assumption. There have
been various attempts [15], [2], [20], [42], [39] at constructing
defenses that increase the robustness of a neural network,
defined as a measure of how easy it is to find adversarial
examples that are close to their original input. To come
up with the strongest attacking algorithm, full adversarial
knowledge was assumed in most of the cases. However, in
real world, one might find that it is not the case most of the
time. A malicious input might not know for instance, how
Amazon Alexa was trained to pass some evil hidden voice
commands. Another example might be ambient noise added
to the input. In the ambient noise case, the input is not altered
on purpose. The input happens to be adversarial because of the
accidental noise in the environment/channel. In that case, the
noise should not result in misclassification if the underlying
RNN is robust against noise. For this reason, we also study
adversarial attacks that are crafted under black box setting
with minimal adversarial knowledge. To craft those attacks, we
apply PCA to reduce dimensionality of the audio signal. In our
case, dimensions are frequency components that makes up the
audio signal after taking the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). We
usually pick a high sampling rate for the FFT to avoid aliasing
such as 16000 Hz. Later, we reconstruct the audio so that we
only keep some percentage of the original information. (mainly
10%,35%,65%, 80%,95%). Since input length is different for
each case, we can’t fix the number of components that are
used to reconstruct the original signal. Instead we fix the
percentage of reconstructed information (that is, how much
of the content is retained after reconstruction). For 25 of
the samples from Common Voice data set, we apply PCA
where we keep 10%, 35%, 60%,90% of the components after
reconstruction. Applying PCA to an audio signal that is under
5 seconds takes about 2-3 seconds. Entire process is completed
over the course of 3-4 hours.
We create adversarial attacks and investigate the differences
by plotting the magnitude (loudness) with respect to time. We
also plot the power with respect to frequencies. Essentially,
we look for differences in time domain as well as frequency
domain. We use magnitude of the components (in decibel
(dB)) as a metric to keep track of how much distortion
is added. We also calculate the normalized edit distance to
quantify how similar two strings are(First string being the
original text, second string being the output of DeepSpeech).
Normalized edit distance is defined as the number of steps
to convert one string to another where each action can only
be ’insertion, deletion, substitution’. This helps us keep track
of the success of targeted adversarial attacks when tested
against DeepSpeech. Figure 1 shows the magnitude of one
of the samples over time. When we create an adversarial
attack by adding adversarial noise to it, we see that magnitude
plot of the waveform has less number of spikes, and more
smooth silhouette. This might be explained by the fact that
we always remove frequencies from the given input whilst
creating adversarial attacks. One can also think of it as ’adding
silence’. For this reason, our distortion metric in dB is always
negative, since the loudness of the adversarial input will be less
than that of the original waveform we started with. Because the
perturbation introduced is quieter than the original signal, the
distortion is a negative number, where smaller values indicate
quieter distortions.
dBx(δ) = dB(δ)− dB(x)
We also use a similarity index to indicate the sequences’
similarity as a float in the range [0, 1].
Similarity = 2.0*M / T
where T is the total number of elements in both sequences,
and M is the number of matches. Note that this is 1.0 if
the sequences are identical, and 0.0 if they have nothing in
common.
IV. DATA
We use ’Common Voice’ data set to craft our adversarial
examples, which is widely used as a standard audio data set
in the literature. Being a common data set, it provides a
ground for different research labs all around the world. We
use 25 samples from Common Voice to create our adversarial
attacks. We also use DeepSpeech, a state-of-the-art speech-to-
text transcription neural network implemented by Mozilla to
test our attacks.
V. RESULTS & OBSERVATIONS
Quick Summary for results are as follows:
1) White-box targeted attacks result in 100% adversarial
success (DeepSpeech can fails to transcribe the original
input and transcribes the targeted sentence instead). So,
all 25 targeted attacks result in misclassification when
tested against DeepSpeech.
2) We can successfully embed voice in music. DeepSpeech
transcribes Bach Cello Suite No:1 as "evil" for instance
3) We can successfully target silence, that is humans can
hear the sentence, but DeepSpeech can’t
4) PCA fails to smooth out adversarial noise.
5) PCA succeeds as a way of creating black-box attacks. We
were able to reconstruct 25 samples from Common Voice
Data set, by keeping 95% of the frequency components,
while achieving 100% adversarial success rate. When
we kept 10% of the frequencies, we also achieve 100%
adversarial success rate, but the input sentence sounds
very corrupted to ear.
6) In the case of 95% reconstruction, we achieve average
similarity ratio of 87.85% percent and normalized edit
distance of 9, whereas in the case of 10% reconstruc-
tion, we achieve average similarity ratio of 27.42%,
and normalized edit distance of 46. We encourage the
user to refer to I for intermediate PCA Reconstruction
percentages. We also encourage the user to listen to
crafted attacks here.
7) We can successfully embed voice in music. This means
an audio that sounds as a song to a human being might
contain hidden voice commands.
8) Targeting a long text when the input audio is short be-
comes very computationally expensive, whereas targeting
a short text such as "evil" when the input audio is long
and is rich in frequencies.
9) Average distortion among adversarial attacks is 28.8232
dB (absolute value is taken), which is equivalent of
ambient noise in a recording.
A. Black-Box Attacks
Black-Box attacks are not targeted. They are weaker but
their advantage is that they don’t have to have full adversarial
knowledge regarding the model. We can use PCA as a way
of crafting adversarial attacks. In figure 3, the input file says
"why should one halt on the way?". There is no targeted text.
We apply PCA, and reconstruct the audio based on the 35
out of 45 frequency components (just for this sample, 95%
refer to first 35 components since input length and frequency
components are never fixed in speech) so that 95% of the
information is stored. DeepSpeech’s output, which is defined
as the transcribed text, is altered but still very close to the
original. DeepSpeech’s output string has a Normalized Edit
Distance of 9 to the original, which means it would take 9-unit
step actions to convert one string to another. Original audio
and the adversarial audio are in this case of 87.85% similarity.
In figure 4, the input file says "why should one halt on
the way?". There is no targeted text. We apply PCA, and
reconstruct the audio based on the 35 out of 45 frequency
components so that 10% of the information is stored. tran-
scribed text is very much altered, and DeepSpeech performs
very poorly, and fails to recognize it. DeepSpeech’s output
string has a Normalized Edit Distance of 46, which means
it would take 46-unit step actions to convert one string to
other. Original audio and the adversarial audio are in this case
of 27.39% similarity. We repeat this step for 25 samples of
the Common Voice data set. We average the similarities, and
normalized edit distances over 25 inputs, while experimenting
with different percentages of the original content that is
retained during PCA reconstruction. Mainly, we experiment
with 10%, 35%, 65%, 80%, and 95% of the original frequency
components during reconstruction phase of PCA. We name
these untargeted adversarial attacks under black-box approach
’10%, 35%, 65%, 80%, and 95% attacks’ to make writing
easier.
B. White-Box attacks
We notice that creating an adversarial gets much more
difficult if the targeted text is long. Every extra character in
the target requires an increase in, therefore for a longer text,
amount of required distortion increases. (In our case adding
more adversarial noise). However, conversely, we observe that
the longer the initial source phrase is, the easier it is to make
it target a given transcription. We attribute this to the fact
that we always remove frequencies from the original sample.
Starting with an input rich in frequencies essentially takes less
duration, and computational resources.
Over 25 targeted adversarial attacks that were crafted had
a mean distortion of 28.8232 dB, which is roughly equivalent
of ambient noise. This validates the work of Nicholas Carlini
et al [11].
We lay out three approaches to study targeted attacks. First
approach is to make the sentence get transcribed as "evil" (as
a proof-of-concept that hidden evil voice commands can be
embedded in voice. Also, longer targets are harder, so "evil"
word works perfectly since it takes less time to minimize the
CTC loss function). Second approach is to embed voice in
music. We achieve that by embedding voice into Bach’s Cello
Suit Noo 1. Third approach is to target silence, where we hide
speech by adding adversarial noise that causes DeepSpeech to
transcribe nothing.
We look for the time vs magnitude plots, time vs frequency,
as well as frequency vs power plots to keep track of our
perturbation. Sample plots can be seen in Figure 1,2, and 3.
Fig. 1. Magnitude vs time(s) Example: ’Why should one halt on the way?’
C. Evaluation
As it can be seen in Figure 2 and 3 that original and
adversarial wave forms are almost visually indistinguishable
when plotted in time as well as frequency domain. When we
Fig. 2. Magnitude vs time(s) for Original and Targeted Adversarial Waves/
When we calculate the percent MSE between two wave forms normalized
with respect to the original waveform, we see 99% similarity between wave
forms.
Fig. 3. Power vs frequency Example: Why should one halt on the way? Red is
the power spectrum of the original wave form, and blue is the power spectrum
of the adversarial wave form that was crafted under white-box approach.
crafted 25 adversarial samples taken from Common Voice Data
set, we achieve 100% adversarial success. DeepSpeech fails
to transcribe the original speech in all of them. In all the
cases, the targeted sentence is chosen to be "evil". Target is
chosen to be relatively a short sentence (i.e only a word in
this case) because it allows us to generate more samples in
shorter amount of time.
Figure 5, and Figure 6 give insight to use of PCA as
a way of crafting adversarial attack. Figure 5 shows the
primary principal component of the sample "It seemed safe and
tranquil." Most of the edges, and noisy spikes are eliminated
Fig. 4. Example of attacking process. In this example, the input file says
"why should one halt on the way?". The targeted text is "evil".
Fig. 5. Primary principal component of the waveform "It seemed safe and
tranquil"
Fig. 6. Comparing PCAs in frequency domain with different percentage of
content retained. From top left to bottom right, we show the magnitude versus
time (s) plot of the original signal as well as when PCA is applied so that
we have 10%, 35%, 65%, 80%, 95% of the original content reconstructed,
respectively.
compared to the original signal in Top left corner of Figure 6
with label "Original".
Figure 8 shows a list of DeepSpeech outputs for the adver-
sarial inputs crafted with PCA 10% reconstruction to make it
easier for the reader to comprehend our work. Output texts
by DeepSpeech are very poor. This shows that our black-box
attacks were successful against DeepSpeech when we used
PCA.
Table I shows the percentages of frequency components that
are used to reconstruct original audio signal. High percentage
Fig. 7. Comparing PCAs in frequency domain with different percentage of
content retained. From top left to bottom right, we show the frequency versus
time (s) plot of the original signal as well as when PCA is applied so that
we have 10%, 35%, 65%, 80%, 95% of the original content reconstructed,
respectively.
Fig. 8. A snapshot of the transcribed outputs given by DeepSpeech when
we only kept 10% of the frequencies. DeepSpeech transcribes the adversarial
inputs very poorly.
Fig. 9. White-Box attacks are targeted. They are stronger but they have to have
full adversarial knowledge. We can target any sentence given any arbitrary
waveform with this approach. This also includes embedding voice in music,
or silencing voice in a waveform. . Adversarial noise is added to the original
input. In this example, the input file says "why should one halt on the way?".
The targeted text is "go to evil.com".
Fig. 10. Black-box attacks are not targeted. They are weaker, but they don’t
have to have full adversarial knowledge. The input file says, "why should
one halt on the way?". There is no targeted text. We apply PCA so that
reconstructed adversarial input has 95% of the original frequency components.
DeepSpeech’s output string has a Normalized Edit Distance of 9 to the original
text. The original audio and the adversarial audio are of 87.85% similarity.
DeepSpeech fails to fully transcribe this adversarial attack.
Fig. 11. In this example,the input file says "why should one halt on the way?".
There is no targeted text. We apply PCA so that reconstructed adversarial input
only has 10% of the original frequency components. DeepSpeech’s output
string has a very poor Normalized Edit Distance of 46 to the original text.
Original audio and the adversarial audio are of 27.39% similarity. DeepSpeech
fails to transcribe this adversarial attack.
means most of the frequency components were kept, and
reconstruction is almost perfect. Low percentage means only
few of the frequency components were kept, and we lose
most of the original information. Information in this context is
the frequency components that make up the signal. Since the
speech duration and the number of frequency components in
an input are not fixed, we can NOT hard code a number for the
frequency components to be used during reconstruction(i.e we
can not say ’pick 3 most primary components, 4 most primary
components etc.’) because we don’t know the number of
frequency components during speech. Speech is a continuous
signal unlike images, which are a discrete signal. Instead of
fixing a certain number for the primary components during
PCA, we experiment with different percentage of information
retain compared to the original signal, with n primary com-
ponents, n being calculated based on the percentage given the
input signal. (ratio of frequency components in the audio used
to reconstruct the original versus all frequency components
defines the percentage of the information retain in this context)
’Similarity’ column in Table I is an index that indicates
how close two signals are as described in Basic Approach
section. ’Normalized Edit Distance’ [23] is the number of
steps necessary to convert one string to another, where actions
are deletion, substitution, insertion. Higher number of actions
means low similarity.
Info. retained(%) Similarity (%) Norm. Edit Distance
10 27.472 46
35 37.472 33
65 42.216 22
80 73.932 14
95 87.850 9
TABLE I
ALL OF THE DATA IS ALSO SHOWN IN FIGURE 12 AND 13.
DeepSpeech performs significantly poorly in the ’10% Re-
construction’ case with an average of 27% similarity index.
For the 95% case, DeepSpeech doesn’t perform as poorly as
the 10% case, but it still fails to fully transcribe the speech.
One has to note that a human can easily tell that the audio
signal has been altered during 10% case . So, during a real-
world adversary attack scenario, use of ’95% Reconstruction’
case would make more sense for the adversary since both
attacks result in transcription failure, but 95% is much similar
to the original audio. So, it gets harder to detect it. We
encourage reader to listen to adversarial attacks created during
this study.1
Fig. 12. Average similarity distance when PCA is applied to all 25 adver-
sarial examples with respect to percentage of components used to craft the
adversarial effect during PCA.
Fig. 13. Average similarity distance when PCA is applied to all 25 adver-
sarial examples with respect to percentage of components used to craft the
adversarial effect during PCA
Generating a single adversarial example requires approxi-
mately three-four hours of compute time on a local hardware(
Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E8400 @ 3.00GHz 2000 with
2 CPU cores and 6144 KB cache size–No GPU ). At most,
two attacks can be crafted simultaneously. Lack of GPU is
definitely a major problem whilst training Machine Learning
Models.
VI. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we studied applying principal components for
generating adversarial attacks as well as using them to look
for defense mechanisms in audio domain against adversarial
attacks. We study the adversarial attacks under white-box and
1https://www.dropbox.com/sh/0e9m4an694lkv6w/AACggV86yaopxKF_
WVt8iTXNa?dl=0
black-box settings.White-box targeted attacks result in 100%
adversarial success (DeepSpeech can fails to transcribe the
original input and transcribes the targeted sentence instead).
So, all 25 targeted attacks result in misclassification when
tested against DeepSpeech. We can successfully embed voice
in music. DeepSpeech transcribes Bach Cello Suite No:1 as
"evil" for instance. We can successfully target silence, that
is humans can hear the sentence, but DeepSpeech can’t.
Additionally, PCA succeeds as a way of creating black-box
attacks. We were able to reconstruct 25 samples from Common
Voice Data set, by keeping 95% of the frequency components,
while achieving 100% adversarial success rate (that is, zero
successful classification by DeepSpeech). When we kept 10%
of the frequencies, we also achieve 100% adversarial success
rate, but the input sentence sounds very corrupted to human
ear. In the case of 95% reconstruction, we achieve average
similarity ratio of 87.85% percent and normalized edit dis-
tance of 9, whereas in the case of 10% reconstruction, we
achieve average similarity ratio of 27.42%, and normalized
edit distance of 46.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Adversarial attacks in audio domain is a relatively new field.
We tried to investigate white-box and black-box approached
attacks and their strengths/weaknesses in audio domain. We
also tried to study one defense mechanism, that is use of PCA
to smooth out the adversarial noise.Future work would include
to study the effect of transferability. Adversarial attacks that
result in misclassification might not do so when tested against
a different model. We still don’t know what criteria/set of
conditions dictates whether a given adversarial input will
be adversary for all other models. The concept of universal
adversarial attacks is still being studied [24].
DeepSpeech implemented by Mozilla currently serves as
a benchmark in literature because of its significant accuracy
(6% word error rate over a corpus of 240 million words)
[12]. Inputs that are adversary for DeepSpeech are de facto
expected to be adversary for other models. So, we are not too
much worried that we couldn’t complete the transferability
studies although we still admit that it would be a worthwhile
to complete transferability studies in the future had we had
more time.
Another point that might be worthwhile to consider is the
possibility of adversarial training. Goodfellow et al showed
that adversarial training can help increase accuracy [5] in
image recognition domain. Such investigation would require
more data, but it would be worthwhile to see the effect of
altered wave forms in the training data set to achieve a more
robust neural network. Overall, we hope our research may
help to advance the study of adversarial attacks on RNNs
and defensive mechanisms to counteract them in the audio
recognition domain.
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